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During the Second World War, the Japanese government and private sector searched for and 
implemented new mechanisms for coordination and new incentives.  One of these was sangyo 
hokokukai or sanpo.  Sanpo unit was essentially an organization of the employer and employees of 
each firm, which held employees meetings to moderate labor relations.  In this paper, I examined the 
role of sanpo, using prefectural data and firm level data, based on a framework integrating the “voice 
view” of unionism and the transaction cost economics.  According to the analysis of prefectural data, 
sanpo reduced the level of participation in labor disputes until around 1941, and enhanced labor 
productivity until 1942.  Estimating production function by monthly firm level data from the cotton 
spinning industry, we found that sanpo increased TFP by 3.1%.  Also, from the annual establishment 
level data from the coal mining industry, we can confirm that sanpo enhanced labor productivity. 
       The Second World War had a tremendous impact on the Japanese economy and a vast amount of 
resources were mobilized for the war effort.  In managing the war economy under a rapidly 
deteriorating environment, the Japanese government and private sector searched for and implemented 
new mechanisms for coordination and new incentives. These included controlling associations 
(toseikai) that acted as intermediaries to pass information back and forth between the government and 
firms, decentralization of decision-making, manipulation of production incentives using price controls, 
intervention in the corporate governance structure, and mediation of syndicate loans by The National 
Financial Control Association
2.   
In addition to these measures, which basically addressed the upper layers of the economic 
system, a new innovation was introduced at the shop floor level. This new innovation was called 
sangyo hokokukai or sanpo.  Sanpo itself was a three-layered organization.  At the bottom, there was 
a sanpo unit at each establishment or each firm.  The sanpo units were organized into regional 
associations, which, in turn, were under the Dai Nihon Sangyo Hokokukai, the national center of the 
sanpo movement, which was controlled by the government.  Here, we focus on the sanpo unit.  The 
sanpo unit played various roles, including holding employees meeting, recreation, and rationing of 
food and clothes.     
      The sanpo system has long been the subject of research in Japan since the early postwar period.  
Kazuo Okochi, who led the field of labor research in postwar Japan, proposed several remarkable 
interpretations of sanpo.  First, in a book published in 1955, he gave a negative assessment of sanpo: 
“Sangyo hokokukai formerly dominated the whole country, but it proved to be ineffective as an 
organizational basis for the war economy in the long run.”
3   On the other hand, in another article in 
1971, he argued, “It was appropriate to attach importance to workers organizations and to have issues 
including employment conditions discussed at employee meetings, to improve communication 
between employers and employees, to increase work incentives and to enhance productivity.” This 
evaluation corresponds to the view that employee meetings continued to be the core of the sanpo 
organization throughout the war period.  Also, he gave sanpo the credit for maintaining order on the 
shop floor during the final stages of the war, and wrote, “(the role of sanpo) was related to the sudden 
emergence of company unions after the war.”  Okochi’s second view is remarkable, in that it can be 
regarded as a forerunner of “voice view” on the role of labor unions.    
      The “voice view” of unionism refers here to the view proposed by C. Brown, R. Freeman and J. 
Medoff that a labor union enhances productivity through making the collective voice of workers 
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4.  First, if the voice of workers is listened to, this reduces the turnover of workers as 
complaints are resolved, thereby saving on training costs and promoting the formation of firm-specific 
skills.  Second, it promotes participation and work incentives for workers through sharing 
information with the employer.  Third, it enables workers to transmit local information on the shop 
floor and their preferences to their employer frankly.    
      As progressive it was, Okochi’s second view has not subsequently been adopted  by later 
research on sanpo.  Andrew Gordon, in his influential book, claimed that employee meetings under 
the sanpo system failed to achieve either harmony between employer and employees or equalization 
among employees, which was pursued during the Sino-Japanese War, and it also failed to enhance 
work incentives, rate of attendance or productivity, which was pursued during the Pacific War
5.  
Yutaka Nishinarita argues that as sanpo could not successfully consolidate workers in the period from 
1938 to 1940, it was reorganized into an organization emulating the army, but it damaged the function 
that mediated labor relations, contrary to the intention of the government
6  Kazuro Saguchi also gives 
a negative evaluation of the actual function of sanpo, though he ranks it highly in ideological terms
7.   
     In this paper, a reconsideration of the role of sanpo in line with Okochi’s second assessment, from 
the standpoint of voice view, will be undertaken.  In applying voice view to wartime Japan, the 
insights provided by transaction cost economics will be incorporated.  Oliver Williamson wrote a 
remarkable comment on the voice view in his book: “Whereas the voice view of unionism attributes 
beneficial governance features to union organization quite generally, the transaction (or governance) 
approach predicts that they will vary with the continuity needs of the parties,” and “those continuity 
needs are greatest where human assets are more highly specific.”
8 Interestingly, as discussed in 
section 2 of this paper, in late 1930s Japan, while the government promoted sanpo, it implemented two 
other labor policies at the same time, namely restricting inter-firm labor transfers and obliging each 
firm to train workers.  These policies imply the imposition of a restriction on the “exit” option of 
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8 O.Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press, 1985, p.257. workers, and the formation of firm-specific skills.  Therefore, according to the voice view and by 
integrating the insight of transaction economics, we can predict that the role of the collective voice of 
workers became more significant due to these policies.  And we can form the hypothesis that the 
voice mechanism was adopted and advanced by the sanpo system.  This hypothesis will be examined 
using quantitative data as well as historical documents.                 
 
2. Wartime labor control and its consequences 
     Japan entered into a war with China in July 1937, when the Japanese economy was already close 
to full employment as a result of around four years of expansion.  The war stimulated the economy 
further, which in turn brought about a large increase in the demand for labor.  Employment in the 
manufacturing sector, which had been 1.66 million in 1931 and 2.56 million in 1936, rose to 3.84 
million in 1940.  The increase in employment numbers was especially sharp in the machinery 
industry, which was closely related to munitions.  It increased from 0.46 million to 1.28 million 
between 1936 and 1940, an increase of 29.3% per year (Figure 1). 
     This sharp increase in the demand for labor brought about serious problems in the labor market 
and in labor relations.  First, a substantial shortage of skilled worker emerged, which caused active 
poaching of skilled workers by firms.  Second, as a sudden rise in inflation occurred and increases in 
the nominal wage lagged behind, there was accelerating labor unrest over demands for wage increases.  
There was a marked increase in large-scale disputes in particular, and the number of workers involved 
in disputes was 2.3 times greater in 1937 than it had been in the previous year (Figure 2).   
     Meanwhile, as part of its preparations for a prolonged war, the government was drawing up a 
long-term plan for production capacity expansion.  The government regarded the shortage of skilled 
workers as a serious problem, and took two measures, namely promotion of worker training and 
regulation of inter-firm labor transfers.  With respect to training, the government established three 
national training centers, and provided subsidies to regional and private training centers.  The annual 
objective was to train 750 skilled workers at the national training centers and 1000 at the regional and 
private centers
9.  However skilled workers were still in short supply.  In 1939, based on the National 
Mobilization Law, the Factory and Establishment Skilled Workers Training Act was passed.  Under 
the Act, the government had the authority to order a private establishment with more than 200 male 
employees older than 16 years, to train a certain number of employees as skilled workers.  To begin 
with, private companies operating in 22 industries including mining, metal, machinery etc. were 
designated to train workers
10. 
     Two points concerning this training policy should be mentioned.  First, whereas at first the 
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workers should have wide ranging technical expertise in the production area of the establishment they 
work at, and should be able to perform their work correctly without supervision from a superior,” and 
“they should not be so called specialized workers who have skills only within a very limited area.”
11  
Even before the Sino-Japanese War, discussions were held among policy makers and researchers on 
the types of skilled workers that should be produced through such a training program, namely, general 
skilled workers or specialized skilled workers.  The Act clearly indicated a preference for training 
general skilled workers.  Also, it is remarkable that this concept of the skilled worker closely 
resembles the worker with “intellectual skill” in the contemporary Japanese manufacturing 
industries
12.  Summing up these two points, we can say that during the war, the government aimed at 
creating workers with general and intellectual skills inside the firm.   
      The regulations covering inter-firm labor transfers, the other policy measure introduced to 
address the shortage of skilled workers, will now be described.  In 1939, at the same time the Factory 
and Establishment Skilled Workers Training Act was introduced, the Employment Restriction Act was 
passed.  This Act was also based on the National Mobilization Law.  According to the Act, the 
employment of male workers aged 15 to 50 years, who had been employed by another employer for 
more than three months, including those who left that employer within six months, had to be approved 
by the chief of the public job introduction office
13.   
     It should be noted that there was a reason why these two Acts were introduced at the same time in 
addition to their common purpose, namely, coping with the shortage of skilled workers.  The workers 
who were restricted from transferring from one firm to another under the Employment Restriction Act 
included those who had been undergoing training according to the Factory and Establishment Skilled 
Workers Training Act for more than three months and those has completed their training within six 
months.   This was to prevent trainees from being poached by another firm
14.  The intention of the 
Act was to prevent a firm from taking unfair advantage of the training provided by another firm, and 
thereby created greater incentives for a firm to train its own workers.  In this sense, the restriction 
placed on transferring from one company to another supported the training policy. 
     Meanwhile, labor disputes, which had become stabilized in 1938, flared up again in 1939 (Figure 
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15.  In a 1939 report, the Police Bureau of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs attributed the unrest to a 
decline in “the cooperative spirit under the emergency” of employers and employees due to the 
prolonged war, workers’ uneasiness about life due to economic controls and inflation, and the decline 
in incomes due to labor controls.
16 In another report issued two years later, the Police Bureau 
documented the influence of labor controls in more in detail: “As labor controls have aimed at 
mobilizing the labor force and its appropriate allocation, these controls have basically focused on 
workers.  Consequently, workers have felt pressures, and some of them complain of the partiality of 
the government policy, which in turn has substantially decreased worker morale and efficiency.  
Concerning the Workers Transfer Restriction Act and National Labor Certificate Law, many workers 
thought that these acts have pegged them at the work place.  Therefore, while inter-firm labor 
transfers have been restricted, complaints from workers regarding labor conditions have been building 
up, and as a result, efficiency has declined due to explicit or implicit sabotage and a decrease in worker 
morale.”
17         
     These observations by the Police Bureau are remarkable in relation to the framework discussed in 
section 1.  They imply that as labor controls restricted the option of workers to exit from a firm, their 
complaints had been mounting inside the firm, which in turn caused labor disputes and a decline in 
efficiency.  A researcher also reported on the Employment Restriction Act in 1940: “Prior to this, 
conflicts could dispersed out of the firm.  However, the restrictions imposed on changing companies 
have confined the conflict to within the firm, which led to disputes and sabotage everywhere.”
18  
Another researcher pointed out “As a result of various restrictive acts, workers have been unable to 
choose what factories they work at.”  Exacerbating the situation, wages were frozen, and as a result, 
“The general disposition of workers has worsened, which in turn has had a negative influence on 
production efficiency, and resulted in a mood conducive to acts of sabotage”
19                    
 
3.Function of sanpo ￿: Descriptive evidence  
      The rise in the number of labor disputes in 1937 compelled the government to examine existing 
measures on labor relations, which resulted in the introduction of the sanpo system
20.  The idea of 
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Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo eds. Fashizumuki no Kokka to Shakai, (States and sanpo originated in a document entitled “Emergency Measures for Moderating Labor Relationship,” 
drafted by the Police Department of Aichi Prefecture in October 1937.  This document proposed the 
setting up of factory committees in which representatives of the employer and employees participated, 
in order to resolve and prevent labor disputes.  On the other hand, employers were opposed to the 
policy promoting a factory committee, as this policy presupposed the existence of a conflict of 
interests between employers and employees.  While there remained some ideological differences 
between the government and employers, many sanpo units were established owing to the policy of the 
Ministry of Domestic Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare, which promoted sanpo.  The proportion of 
workers participating in sanpo (members of sanpo/total workers) exceeded 40% at the end of 1939, 
and reached 70% by the end of 1941 (Figure 3).        
     While the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare at first placed importance on 
the proper management of labor relations at sanpo meetings, from late 1939 they began to modify their 
official view.  They announced an alternative official view that work was a national duty and sanpo 
meetings were a way of fulfilling that duty.  As the document pointing to this change in policy, 
precedent literature has focused on “Outline of the Sanpo Movement,” issued by the Labor Bureau of 
the Ministry of Welfare (November 1939)
21.  It is true that the document clearly stated, “the 
discussions on labor conditions during the early stages of the sanpo movement were due to a 
misunderstanding of the essence of the sanpo meeting.”  However, at the same time, the sanpo 
meeting itself was still strongly emphasized in this document.  Also, it was still thought to be 
desirable for members to talk frankly about their experiences, research, original ideas, opinions and 
desires.   
     In November 1940, the Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai was established as the national center of the 
sanpo movement, and was a part of the New Economic System in a broad sense.
22  The policy of the 
Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai on the sanpo unit conformed to the “Outline of the Sanpo Movement” 
mentioned above.  In fact, a document by the Dainihon Sangyo Hokokukai, “The New Aims of the 
Sanpo Movement Facing the War” written in September 1941, has been frequently cited as evidence 
indicating the change in the nature of the sanpo system.
23  The major thrust of the document was to 
reorganize a sanpo unit into a hierarchical organization corresponding to the firm’s organization, 
emulating the army, and to make sanpo meetings a supplementary organ of authoritarian control.  
Makoto Sakurabayashi wrote that “Downgrading the meeting to a supplementary organ, this reform 
formally as well as actually abolished the sanpo’s function of managing or changing labor relations 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Societies during the Fascism Period ), vol.6, The University of Tokyo Press, 1974   
21 F.Kanda, Shiryo Nihon Gendaishi, (Materials of the Contemporary Japanese History), Otsuki 
Shoten, 1981, p.597.  
22 Concerning the New Economic System, see T.Okazaki, “Corporate Governance,” in T. Okazaki and 
M. Okuno-Fujiwara eds. The Japanese Economic System op cit.   
23 Kanda, Shiryo, p.604; Sakurabayashi, Sangyohokokukai, p.12; Nishinarita, Kindai Nihon. 
Pp.400-401. focusing on labor conditions.”
24  However, this document did not reject the idea that sanpo meetings 
played a role in the moderation of labor relations, and also stressed that sanpo meetings should be 
utilized more effectively. 
     As a matter of fact, the government authorities retained high expectations that sanpo would 
continue to function as a moderating influence on labor relations, and greatly valued the role it was 
actually playing.  A report by a judge of the Nagoya Regional Court, Hisaaki Okagaki, contains a lot 
of useful information about the views of the government authorities on sanpo.
25  A document issued 
by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police wrote about the functions of the sanpo system as follows:  
 
It is readily evident that the sanpo movement has spawned many sanpo units at individual 
establishments in a year or so, and has been has been exerting a positive influence on various 
aspects of the industrial labor relations and society. -- Omission-- Consequently, harmonization 
between employers and employees, saving money and resources, and preventing industrial 
accidents have been gradually realized, which, in turn, has lifted morale in the work place.  These 
are desirable phenomena.  Also, this positive state of affairs has been directly reflected in 
production to enhance efficiency, improve work processes, upgrade technology, and develop a 
cooperative working environment.  It is notable that these have had substantial positive effect on 
technology and production. Furthermore, concerning labor management, improvements in 
personnel administration, rationalization of labor conditions, establishment of welfare 
organizations and communication have been realized, which have been effective in addressing 
complaints, excluding conflicts and resolving class confrontations.
26    
 
We can say that, aside from the official line, the Metropolitan Police recognized that class 
confrontation was a reality, and that the sanpo system had been helping to resolve workers’ complaints 
including labor conditions as well as contributing to the improvement of productivity.           
     On the other hand, Okagaki’ s report also cited articles critical of sanpo.  An article written by 
Masami Matsuzaki, a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Welfare, falls into this category.  It is true that this 
article criticized management of sanpo meetings at some firms, but it concluded “generally speaking, 
we cannot deny that due to the establishment of sanpo meetings, opportunities for frank discussions 
have been given to employers and employees, which have generated a sense of personal trust between 
the two parties and have been helping to raise morale in the work place.  Specifically, it is clearly 
observed that active utilization of sanpo meetings has been effective in preventing and resolving labor 
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27   As evidence, Matsuzaki wrote, “by referring to the fact that labor disputes have 
frequently occurred at those factories where the sanpo movement is relatively inactive and both 
employers and employees are indifferent to the holding of sanpo meetings, we can presume that sanpo 
meetings are effective in preventing and resolving labor disputes.”
28   
     Finally, Okagaki’s report cited a document issued by the Police Bureau of the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs, “Sangyo Hokoku Undo Gaikan” (An Overview of the Sanpo Movement).  In this 
document, the Police Bureau concluded that sanpo had three major effects.  First, sanpo contributed 
to industrial productivity: “It is thought to be one of the achievements of the sanpo movement that 
under the prevailing bad social and economic conditions, productivity has been maintained at the 
present level, and that some establishments are even achieving higher levels of productivity than 
before.”   Second, sanpo has contributed to both preventing and resolving labor disputes: “The gap 
between prices and wages, which is the major cause of labor disputes, is presently the widest it has 
ever been, and there is a ample justification for an explosion in the number of labor disputes.  
However, labor disputes have been kept down to a reasonable level.  This is partly because of the 
emergent situation, but we need to recognize that the sanpo movement convinced employers and 
employees that disputes were anti-state, and that the causes of disputes have also been removed [in 
some cases] by utilizing sanpo meetings.  Also, we can regard as an achievement of this movement 
the fact that there are many cases where the expansion of disputes was checked and they were resolved 
quickly, owing to the sanpo meetings.”  Third, “as the sanpo movement requires the establishment of 
personal trust between employers and employees, it has increased opportunities for contacts between 
them.  As a result, trust and understanding have gradually grown, which in turn has improved the 
overall atmosphere in work places.”
29                
    All of the  documents cited above indicate that  the government authorities had high expectations of 
and positively evaluated the functions of sanpo, especially the capacity of sanpo meetings to prevent 
disputes and to enhance productivity, at least until 1940-1941.  Moreover, this kind of evaluation was 
not limited to government authorities.  Tadao Kikukawa, the ex-general secretary of the Japan 
Federation of Labor, the largest federation of labor unions, argued against the position that sanpo was 
not only ineffective in preventing labor disputes but also caused them.  He said, “Facts clearly 
indicate that labor disputes have been prevented by the sanpo movement.  In those prefectures where 
the  sanpo movement has proliferated, for example in Tokyo, the number of disputes has been 
declining over the last two years.  On the other hand, in those prefectures where disputes have 
increased since last year, the growth of the sanpo movement has generally been limited.”
30     
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30 Ibid, pp.555-556. 4.Function of sanpo￿: Quantitative analyses 
     The article by Kikukawa cited in the previous section gives us a good starting point for a 
quantitative analysis.  He focused on the relationship between the sanpo movement and labor 
disputes at the prefectural level.  We can formally test his casual observation using the following data.  
Monthly prefectural data on labor dispute participants, and semiannual prefectural data on the labor 
force are available in various issues of the Rodo Jiho (Labor Bulletin) released by the Ministry of 
Welfare.  Also, from June 1939, the monthly prefectural data on the number of sanpo members are 
available from the same source.  Based on these data, we constructed panel data for 47 prefectures for 
* 5 semiannual periods from 1940.1-6 to 1942.1-6, with respect to the dispute participation ratio (the 
participants of disputes/the total labor force excluding agriculture, forestry and fishery workers, 
DISPUTE) and the ratio of sanpo members to the total labor force (excluding agriculture, forestry and 
fishery workers, SANPO).  Out of these, the eight observations where SANPO>1 were excluded.  
The basic statistics are shown in Table 1.  Using the data, we estimate the following equation. 
 
DISPUTEit=a0+a1SANPOit-1+a2 MALEit-1+Σat*PERIODt+Σai*PREFEi+eit,           (1) 
 
MALE, PERIOD and PREFE refer to the ratio of male workers, the semiannual period dummies, and 
the prefecture dummies, respectively, and e is an error term.  The subscript i indicates prefecture and 
t indicates period. Because DISPUTE is zero for 61 observations, I estimate equation (1) using Tobit 
model. The results are reported in Table 2.  In equation (1)-1, a1 is negative as expected, but not 
statistically significant.  In equation (1)-2, the interaction terms SANPO and PERIOD were added, 
and the a1 coefficient was positive but not significant.  On the other hand, the interaction term with the 
period dummy for the second half of 1940 and first half of 1941 were negative and significant.  Also, 
the sum of a1 and the coefficient of each of these interaction terms was negative suggesting that sanpo 
contributed to reducing the participation of workers in labor disputes.   
     Next, we examine the effect of sanpo on labor productivity.  Based on the various issues of Kojo 
Tokeihyo (Manufacturing Census) by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, we constructed panel 
data on 47 prefectures for * 3 years from 1940 to 1942 with respect to production output, labor force, 
and number of factories. Here, 19 observations where SANPO>1, were excluded and using the data 




PROD refers to labor productivity, namely production output/labor force, SCALE refers to the average 
number of workers per factory, and YEAR is the year dummies.  The basic statistics and estimation 
results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4.  In equation (2)-1 b1 is positive and statistically significant, which means sanpo had a positive effect on labor productivity.  Moreover, as discussed above, sanpo 
had the capacity to prevent labor disputes, and the increased labor productivity is therefore thought to 
be composed of the fractional decrease in disputes coupled with fractional contributions by the other 
effects.  Where DISPUTE is added to equation (2)-1(equation (2)-2), the coefficient of DISPUTE is 
negative as expected but not statistically significant, and shows only a slight decrease, which implies 
that the positive effect of sanpo on labor productivity is basically due to mechanisms other than the 
prevention of disputes.  In order to verify the effect of sanpo over time, we add the interaction term, 
SANPO and the year dummies.  The coefficients of the interaction terms with the 1941 and 1942 
dummies are negative but not statistically significant, and the magnitude and significance of b1 did not 
change substantially.  We can say that the labor productivity effect of sanpo was sustained from 1940 
to 1942. 
     To  this point, we have  used prefectural  data.  Next, we will examine firm and establishment level 
data.  For this purpose, firm and establishment information on sanpo is necessary.  Fortunately, Rodo 
Jiho .records the name and the founding date of each sanpo unit established from July 1938 to July 
1939 by an establishment or firm.  Matching this data with other relevant firm or establishment data, 
we can ascertain the effect of sanpo on productivity. 
     There are few industries for which detailed firm or establishment production data are available at 
frequent time intervals.  One of them is the cotton spinning industry.  Monthly firm production data, 
number of operating machines, consumption of raw cotton, and number of workers by sex, are 
available in Dainihon Meishi Boseki Rengokai Geppo (Monthly Bulletin of Japan Cotton Spinning 
Association). Using these data, we derived the following Cobb-Douglas type production function, to 




+Σci*FIRMi+eit                                                 (3) 
 
Y, K, L and M denote production of cotton yarn, number of operating machines, number of workers 
and consumption of raw cotton, respectively.  MONTH are the month dummies, and FIRM are firm 
dummies.  SANPOit-1 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if there was a sanpo unit in firm i at the 
end of month t-1, and 0 otherwise.  Those firms where the sanpo unit was organized by the 
establishment, whether or not the firm had a sanpo unit was confirmed, and if there was a sanpo unit in 
at least one establishment of the firm.  If c1 is positive, sanpo brought about an upward shift in the 
production function, or in other words, sanpo enhanced the total factor productivity (TFP).   
     The sample used was 59 firms whose production data were continuously available from January 
1938 to December 1939.  Concerning these firms we constructed panel data from January 1938 to August 1939.  To standardize for any sex-related efficiency discrepancy we converted male workers 
into female workers based on the wage ratio (the male wage/the female wage).  The monthly wage 
data on the cotton spinning industry by sex are collected from Rodo Tokei (Labor Statistics) by the 
Bank of Japan. The basic statistics and estimation results of equation(3) are reported in Table 5 and 
Table 6.  The coefficient c1 is positive and statistically significant with a value of 0.031 suggesting 
that sanpo increased TFP by 3.1%.     
     It was fortunate that detailed data were available on the cotton spinning industry at frequent time 
intervals, but the data was restricted in it applicability as most of the workers were female.  Also, as it 
was not designated by the Employment Restriction Act, we cannot examine the influence of 
restrictions on inter-firm labor transfers discussed in the previous sections.  Due to these limitations, 
we next used data on the coal mining industry.   The issues of Honpo Kogyo no Susei (The Trend of 
the Japanese Mining Industry) by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry contain the mining 
(establishment) data on production and workers.  From this source, panel data from 1937 to 1940 was 
constructed.  The number of workers employed in the mines changed by year, and in this sense it is an 
unbalanced panel.  Using this data, the following equation on labor productivity was estimated. 
 
PRODit = d0+d1SANPOit-1+d2logYit+ΣbiMINE+ΣbtYEAR+eit                      (4) 
 
PROD refers to labor productivity (coal production/workers).  MINE is the mine dummies.  
SANPOit-1 is a dummy variable which equals 1, if there was a sanpo unit at mine i at the end of the 
previous year.  In 1939, due to limited availability of data, this dummy variable equals 1 if there was a 
sanpo unit at the end of July 1939.   The basic statistics and estimation results are shown in Table 7 
and Table 8.  In equation(4)-1, d1 is positive, but not statistically significant.  In equation (4)-2, the 
interaction terms of SANPO and YEAR are added producing d1 as negative and statistically significant, 
but the interaction term with the 1939 and 1940 dummies were positive and statistically significant.  
In addition, the absolute value for each interaction term coefficient is larger than d1.  This means that 
whereas sanpo had a negative effect on labor productivity in 1938, the effect of sanpo on labor 
productivity was positive in 1939 and 1940.  As mentioned in section 2, inter-firm [transfer][shifting] 
of workers was regulated from March 1939 with respect to [a number of][the] industries including coal 
mining.  The above result suggests that the positive effect of sanpo on labor productivity was realized 
after the implementation of the regulation, which is consistent with the hypothesis in section 1 that 
sanpo complemented the restriction on inter-firm labor transfers. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
Many articles and books have been written on sanpo.  However, there has been no attempt to 
evaluate sanpo quantitatively.  As mentioned in section 1, most of the recent literature has evaluated the function of sanpo in negative terms, but they have basically relied on a small number of case 
studies or negative contemporary observations.  But, as discussed in section 3, there is a significant 
body of anecdotal evidence which indicates that sanpo had substantial positive effects in terms of 
preventing labor disputes and enhancing efficiency.  In order to finally resolve this question, 
quantitative examinations are necessary.  This paper is the first attempt to do this. 
 According to the analysis of prefectural data, sanpo reduced the level of participation in labor 
disputes until around 1941, and enhanced labor productivity until 1942.   Also, estimating production 
function by monthly firm level data from the cotton spinning industry, we found that sanpo increased 
TFP by 3.1%.  From the annual establishment level data from the coal mining industry, we can 
confirm that sanpo enhanced labor productivity. 
  In this paper, these results were interpreted within a framework that integrated the voice view of 
unionism advanced by Freeman et al. and transaction cost economics.  Those effects of sanpo 
confirmed in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that sanpo provided the workers with a 
collective voice.  The significance of this collective voice mechanism was arguably greater in 
wartime Japan, because inter-firm labor transfers were regulated and at the same time employees were 
trained to become skilled workers with “intellectual skill” inside each firm.  The results with respect 
to the coal mining industry that sanpo had not been effective until 1939, are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 

























Figure1 Number of employees




































Figure 2 Labor disputes Number of disputes Number of perticipantsTable 1 Basic statistics on labor disputes
DISPUTE MALE(-1) SANPO(-1)
Average 0.00272 0.684 0.646
Stdev 0.00585 0.119 0.182
Max 0.06366 0.904 0.995
Min 0.00000 (-0.287) 0.163 (0.557)
(-0.1885) (0.240)








Constant -0.00469 (-0.287) -0.00908 (0.557)
SANPO(-1) -0.00098 (-0.1885) 0.00125 (0.240)
MALE(-1) 0.03367 (1.529) 0.01876 (0.863)
1940L -0.00244 (-1.899) 0.00684 (1.451)
1941F -0.00551 (-3.141) 0.00539 (1.298)
1941L -0.00775 (-4.058) -0.01340 (-2.082)





Log of Likelihood 597.448 605.061
Observations 227 227
Note: See the text.  t-values are in parentheses.
￿￿Prefecture dummies are included, although not reported.Table 3 Basic statistics on labor productivity by prefecture
PROD SCALE MALE DISPUTE SANPO(-1)
Average 6,342 29.466 0.588 0.006 0.672
Stdev 2,707 23.640 0.147 0.011 0.206
Max 18,119 239.053 0.872 0.082 0.995
Min 553 (-0.287) 0.055 (0.557) 0.165
(-0.1885) (0.240)




(-3.694)Table 4 Effect of sanpo on labor productivity ￿Prefecture level data of manufacturing
Dependent variable￿PROD
Method of estimation￿OLS
(1)-1 (1)-2 (1)-3 (1)-4
Constant -3701.440 (-0.287) -4192.600 (0.557) -2995.260 (-1.068) -3577.500 (-1.277)
SANPO(-1) 1178.620 (-0.1885) 2818.440 (0.240) 1742.430 (2.423) 2730.590 (2.319)
MALE 13370.200 (1.529) 13453.900 (3.702) 13031.600 (3.564) 13210.000 (3.510)
SCALE 11.411 (-1.899) 10.488 (0.954) 10.638 (0.992) 10.047 (0.893)
1941 -286.681 (-3.141) 674.383 (0.548) -304.539 (-1.015) 680.203 (0.548)
1942 -656.682 (-4.058) 293.759 (0.217) -735.950 (-2.175) 113.435 (0.0874)
SANPO(-1)*1941 (-3.694) -1612.120 (-0.963) -1623.920 (-0.963)
SANPO(-1)*1942 -1581.440 (-0.803) -1420.050 (-0.754)
DISPUTE -9261.390 (-0.520) -8267.030 (-0.505)
adR2 0.872 0.871 0.871 0.870
Log of Likelihood -987.124 -976.829 -977.721 -976.512
Observations 122 122 122 122
Note: See the text.  T-values by White heteroscedasticity estimator of standard deviation are in parentheses.
     Prefecture dummies are included, although not reported. Table 5 Basic Statistics on production function of cotton spinnig industry
ln(Y) ln￿K￿ ln(L) ln(M) SANPO
Average 4.913 4.705 3.093 4.966 0.303
Stdev 0.581 0.593 0.492 0.576 0.460
Max 6.357 6.270 4.328 6.409 1.000
Min 3.522 (-0.287) 2.172 (0.557) 0.000
(-0.1885) (0.240)




(-3.694)Table 6  Production function of cotton spining industry
Dependent variable: log(Y)









Note: See the text. 
   T-values by White heteroscedasticity robust estimator of standard deviation are in parentheses.
   Month dummies and firm dummies are included, although not reported.Table 7  Basic Statistics on labor productivity of coal mines
PROD log(Y) SANPO(-1)
Average 169.775 11.096 0.125
Stdev 131.703 1.348 0.330
Max 2677.514 15.094 1.000
Min 17.298 8.323 0.000
Source: See the text.Table 8 Effect of sanpo on labor productivity: Establishment level data of coal mining indistry
Dependent variable: EFFIC
Method of estimation: OLS
(1)-1 (1)-2
Constant -792.598 (-2.093) -792.462 (-2.089)
SANPO(-1) 9.392 (0.837) -53.824 (-2.510)
LogY 65.741 (2.614) 65.737 (2.610)
1938 -1.061 (-0.102) -0.778 (-0.074)
1939 -17.839 (-2.850) -17.850 (-2.833)




Log of Likelihood -5690.2 -5689.8
Observation 1019 1019
Note￿See the text.
  T-values by White heteroscedasticity robust estimator of standard deviation are in parentheses.
  Mine dummies are included, although not reported.